



Perceptions of adolescents regarding armed conflict in Kashmir

¹ Dr. Muzamil Jan, ² Shazia Manzoor

¹ Sr. Assistant Professor, Institute of Home Science, University of Kashmir, Jammu Kashmir, India

² Research Scholar, Institute of Home Science, University of Kashmir, Jammu Kashmir, India

Abstract

The present study was an attempt to observe the attitude of adolescents regarding armed conflict in Kashmir as per affect of conflict (intact and disrupted), dwelling and gender. The sample was selected through multi stage sampling technique. For the sample 800 adolescents were selected from urban and rural areas of Kashmir. The sample was collected with the help of self-constructed questionnaire. The study shows that the majority of intact-disrupted adolescents, adolescent boys-girls and rural-urban adolescents perceive armed conflict in Kashmir as political conflict. Adolescents in greater number believe that state government and armed force are responsible for unrest in Kashmir. A meager fraction of adolescents holds militants and local leaders culpable. Majority of adolescents expect that normalcy will return to Kashmir. Adolescents prefer good governance and peaceful dialogue in context to this.

Keywords: perception, adolescents, armed conflict, Kashmir

Introduction

The imagination, ideals and energies of youth are vital for the continuing development of the societies in which they live. All cultures recognize adolescence as a highly significant period in which young people learn future roles and incorporate the values and norms of their societies. Adolescents face particular problems during periods of armed conflicts. They are at a time of life when they are undergoing many physical and emotional changes. During conflicts, adolescent girls are particularly at risk for gender-based violence and sexual exploitation. Sudden changes in family circumstances, such as the death or disappearance of parents, can leave young people without guidance, role models and sustenance (UN, 2013) ^[1]. UNICEF and the Gaza Health Ministry reported that from 8 July to 2 August, 296–315, Palestinian children died due to Israeli action, and 30 per cent of civilian casualties were children (UNICEF, 2014) ^[2]. By 27 August, 2014 in Gaza the total number of children killed was to 495-578 (Palestinian ministry of health, 2014) ^[3]. In Kashmir most alarming aspect of the conflict is that prominent victims of violence during the last two decades were the youth. They at once become the targets, perpetrators as well as survivors of conflict while their childhood was lost in the incidents of armed conflict, they could not be socialized in proper cultural and religious ethos of Kashmir. During the last two decades the Kashmir society has scattered, leaving children either orphaned or as household heads. (Hassan, 2011) ^[4].

Review of literature

Mels *et al* (2015) ^[5] explores surviving approach used by war-affected eastern Congolese adolescents across age and sex, and the relationship between post-traumatic stress symptoms and engagement and disengagement coping. Cross-sectional data were collected in 11

secondary schools across four areas in the Ituri province, Democratic Republic of Congo. A total of 952 pupils (45.3 per cent girls, 54.7 per cent boys) aged 13–21 years took part in self-report assessment, using tools that were either purposely developed, authenticated or evaluated for the study population. Reported coping strategies varied with age, and boys more often reported problem solving and resignation as compared with girls. Disconnection coping was linked with lower symptom scores in younger adolescent girls, as was the communication outcome between engagement and disengagement coping.

Jabbar and Zaza (2014) ^[6] performed a study to investigate the impact of the conflict in Syria on Syrian refugee children. The Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan was selected for this task. Two control groups of children were chosen, one from the Jordanian Ramtha district and the other from Amman. The study compared the Zaatari, Ramtha and Amman groups in terms of expressed anxiety and depression symptoms. They were also compared with respect to their gender and age. The Zaatari children were more distraught than the others, and the symptom 'thoughts of ending your life' was articulated only by this group. The Ramtha group also expressed some grief. The reality that this group in some way experiences the price of violence highlights the horrible conditions of children inside Syria who are trapped between fighting groups.

Biziouras and Birger (2013) ^[7] investigated the role of education in the reintegration of war affected youth in Uganda by merging participant observation data with a micro level survey of different educational settings. The researchers found that greater the level of regulation and use of monetary resources embedded; the greater are the chances of education to work as an engine for reintegration of war affected youth. Estimated the effect of armed conflict exposure on school dropout and labor choice of Colombian children between the ages of 6 and

17. The experimental approach is based on two-stage duration analysis and biprobit inference that take into account the endogeneity of conflict. The researchers found that conflict affects children older than 11, inducing them to drop out of school and go into the labor market too early. It was also found that short-term exposure to violence is the most relevant for these decisions and likely sources of communication include higher death risks, depressing financial distress, and inferior school excellence.

Kohrt (2010) ^[8] employs social ecology to evaluate psychosocial well being in a cross sectional sample of 142 ex- child soldiers in Nepal. Result measures included the Depression Self Rating scale (DSRS), Child Post Traumatic Stress Scale (CPSS) and locally developed measures of role harm and reintegration. At the child level, traumatic contact, particularly torment, predicted outcomes, while education improved result. At the family level, conflict-related loss of a relative, bodily violence in the family circle, and loss of material goods during the conflict predicted reduced result.

Objectives

The present study is based on the following objectives:

1. To study the perception of adolescents regarding armed conflict in Kashmir.
2. To study the attitude of adolescents towards normalcy in Kashmir.

Material and Methods

The present study was an attempt to study the attitude of adolescents regarding armed conflict in Kashmir as per affect of conflict (intact and disrupted), dwelling and gender. The information was gathered from adolescents in urban and rural areas of Kashmir region. The study was investigated through multi stage sampling technique. This type of sampling was taken because the size of population (i.e. Kashmir) was very large and was scattered as per socio-economic characteristics of adolescents. The sample selected by this method was more representative of population. It permitted the fieldwork to be concentrated and yet large area covered. Sample was selected from Kashmir region-800 adolescents were selected for the purpose, 400 adolescents from urban areas and 400 adolescents from rural areas. The tool used for the study include a detailed questionnaire. The data obtained was carefully scrutinized, categorized and coded in order to fulfill the objectives. The data was analyzed applying appropriate statistical measures.

Results and Discussion

Since adolescence is regarded as the period of ideas, conclusions, identities and perceptions; hence at this stage adolescents have capability to spell out their perception, attitude, appraisal and vision on state of affairs concerning ongoing armed conflict in Kashmir.

Perception Regarding Armed Conflict in Kashmir

Table 1 depicts majority i.e. 72.2 per cent (f=289) intact adolescents and 78.8 per cent (f=315) disrupted adolescents perceive armed conflict in Kashmir as

political conflict. Whereas, 12.2 per cent (f=49) intact adolescents term it as religious conflict and 8.2 per cent (f=33) disrupted adolescents phrase it as historical conflict. Similarly, 74.25 per cent (f=297) adolescent boys and 76.25 (f=307) girls view it as political conflict. Moreover, 75.75 per cent (f=303) rural adolescents and 75.25 per cent (f=301) urban adolescents also sight it as political conflict. In general, 75.5 per cent (f=604) adolescents consider current armed conflict as political, 9 per cent (f=72) as religious, 8 per cent (f=64) as historical and 7.5 per cent as conflict between communities. Highly significant differences are visible for perceptions of armed conflict in Kashmir among intact-disrupted adolescents χ^2 (3,800) =10.63, p=0.01 and boys-girls χ^2 (3,800) =16.03, p=0.00. However, insignificant differences are marked among rural-urban adolescents χ^2 (3,800) =0.31, p=0.95. Perception about armed conflict in Kashmir shows positive significant correlation among intact-disrupted adolescents r (800) =.077, p= .029. Whereas, negative insignificant correlation is seen among adolescent boys-girls r (800) = -0.013 p= 0.722 and positive insignificant correlation among rural-urban adolescents r (800) =0.004, p=0.914, Table 2 shows that according to 73.0 per cent (f=146) intact rural and 71.5 per cent (f=143) urban adolescents ongoing conflict is completely political; whereas 12.5 per cent (f=25) and 12 per cent (f=24) of intact rural and urban adolescent regard it as religious conflict. In the same way, 78.5 per cent (f=157) disrupted rural and 79.0 per cent (f=158) urban adolescents name it as political conflict and only 6 per cent (f=12) disrupted rural and 5.5 per cent (f=11) urban adolescents perceive it as religious conflict. Intact rural and intact urban adolescents demonstrate insignificant differences in relation to perception of armed conflict in Kashmir χ^2 (3,400) =0.89, p=0.82. Likewise, disrupted rural and disrupted urban adolescents also show insignificant differences χ^2 (3,400) =0.11, p=0.99. Perception regarding armed conflict in Kashmir as per dwelling reveals negative insignificant correlation among intact rural-urban adolescents r (400) =-0.069, p=0.167 and disrupted rural-urban adolescents r (400) =-0.085, p=0.091.

Table 3 reveals that 72 per cent (f=144) intact boys, 72.5 per cent (f=145) intact girls, 76.5 disrupted boys and 81.0 per cent disrupted girls perceive ongoing armed conflict as political conflict. Whereas, 15.5 per cent (f=31) intact boys term it as religious conflict and 10.5 per cent (f=21) disrupted boys describe it as historical conflict. In contrast to this, 11.5 per cent (f=23) intact girls and 9 per cent (f=18) disrupted girls portray it as conflict between communities. Opinion regarding armed conflict in Kashmir observes highly significant differences between intact boys and intact girls about χ^2 (3,400) =11.00 p=0.01. But insignificant differences among disrupted boys and disrupted girls χ^2 (3,400) =6.53, p=0.08. Perception concerning armed conflict in Kashmir as per gender exhibits positive insignificant correlation among intact boys-girls r (400) =0.014, p=0.776 and negative insignificant correlation between disrupted boys-girls r(400) =-0.042, p=0.403

Chadha (2012) ^[9] studied that youth hold an essential key

to understanding Kashmir's political dynamics. The youth of Kashmir valley are focus of attention for many compelling reasons. It is worth noting that currently 48 per cent of the Kashmir valleys' population falls within the age group of fifteen to thirty. Swami (2010) ^[10] suggested that Kashmiri youth need to be provided the necessary political space so that they feel part of the peace process and general political developments. With modernization and urbanization, youth is getting more education and they consistently discuss political and social issues with their peer group and family. Yasmin (2013) ^[11] reported about perception study of media impact on the Kashmir youth in January 2011, wherein it was found that general political awareness of the Kashmir youth is very high.

Responsible for Unrest in Kashmir

There are different versions regarding culpability for unrest in Kashmir put forth by different sources. In this background, table 1 shows that 51 per cent (f=204) intact adolescents and 60 per cent (f=240) disrupted adolescents hold state government responsible for unrest in Kashmir. Whereas, 42.8 per cent (f=171) and 35.2 per cent (f=141) intact and disrupted adolescents blame armed force for unrest. In addition 47.25 per cent (f=189) adolescent boys charge armed force for turmoil. However, 64.5(f=258) adolescent girls accuse state government. In contrast to this, 59.75 per cent (f=239) rural and 51.25 per cent (f=205) urban adolescents think that state government is blameworthy, whereas, 35.75 per cent (f=143) and 42.25 per cent (f=169) rural and urban adolescents respectively consider armed force responsible for it. On the whole adolescents in great number i.e. 55.5 (f=444) per cent and 39 per cent (f=312) believe that state government and armed force are respectively responsible. A meager fraction adolescents i.e. 2.9 per cent (f=23) and 2.6 per cent (f=21) respectively hold militants and local leaders culpable. Culpable for unrest in Kashmir shows insignificant differences among intact-disrupted adolescents χ^2 (3,800) =7.03, p=0.07 and rural-urban adolescents χ^2 (3,800) =6.35, p=0.09. While highly significant differences are found between adolescent boys and girls χ^2 (3,800) = 29.58, p=0.00. Accountable for unrest in Kashmir displays positive insignificant correlation among intact-disrupted adolescents r (800) =0.085, p=0.017 and negative significant correlation between rural-urban adolescents r (800) =-0.082, p=0.021 whereas adolescent boys-girls depict positive highly significant correlation r (800) =0.190, p=0.000.

As per table 2 state government and armed force is held responsible by 55.5 per cent (f=111) and 40.5 per cent (f=81) intact rural adolescents respectively. Likewise, 46.5 per cent (f=93) and 45.0 per cent (f=90) intact urban adolescents blame respectively state government and armed force. In the same way 64.0 per cent (f=128) disrupted rural adolescents also charge state government for unrest and only 2 per cent (f=4) lay the blame on local leaders. Disrupted urban adolescents 56.0 per cent (f=112) also feel that state government is guilty and just 2.5 per cent (f=5) accuse militants for disorder. With respect to guilty for unrest in Kashmir, insignificant differences are evident between intact rural-urban

adolescents χ^2 (3,400) =5.31, p=0.14 and among disrupted rural-urban adolescents χ^2 (3,400) =3.20, p=0.36. Culpable for instability in Kashmir as per dwelling discloses positive insignificant correlation among intact rural-urban adolescents r (400) =0.081, p=0.105 and disrupted rural-urban adolescents r (400) =0.088, p=0.078.

Table 3 put forth that state government is responsible for unrest in Kashmir as per 45 per cent (f=90) intact boys, 57 per cent (f=114) intact girls, 48 per cent (f=96) disrupted boys and 72 per cent (f=144) disrupted girls. On contrary to this, 46 per cent (f=92) intact boys 39.5 per cent (f=79) intact girls, 48.5 per cent (f=97) disrupted boys and 22 per cent (f=44) disrupted girls hold armed force responsible for turbulence in Kashmir. In relation to culpable for unrest in Kashmir, significant differences are visible between intact boys and intact girls χ^2 (3,400) =8.73 p=0.03. On the other hand, highly significant differences are spotted among disrupted boys and girls χ^2 (3,400) =38.64, p=0.00. Liable for unrest in Kashmir as per gender shows positive significant correlation among intact boys and girls r (400) =0.119, p=0.01 and positive highly significant correlation among disrupted boys and girls r (400) =0.261, p=0.000.

Sudan (2007) studied that Kashmiri youth perceive regional imbalances especially unequal economic growth along geographical lines, economic divisions along local areas, unequal distribution of public and private investment, unequal access to social services, unequal access to relief and development assistance, and worsening polarization of the local communities and residences are responsible for ongoing conflict. Mukherjee (2013) ^[13] reveals that poverty, corruption, administrative failure, identity politics and violence are some of the key features associated with Kashmir conflict. The situation always remains volatile, fraught with uncertainty.

Normalcy in Kashmir

Hasnain (2017) ^[14] defined normalcy in pure security terms as the relative absence of violence, the enhanced confidence of society and the rekindling of hope and found that on all three counts the situation in Kashmir does not appear to inspire too much confidence. Normalcy in Kashmir has become a dream for locals because in valley each calm period is a sign of fierce storm. In this context table 1 reveals that 74.2 per cent (f=297) intact and 75.5 per cent (f=302) disrupted adolescents believe that permanent normalcy will return to valley but 25.8 per cent (f=103) intact and 24.5 per cent (f=98) disrupted adolescents feel that it will never return. Among boys 82 per cent (f=328) think that normalcy will return whereas 32.25 per cent (f=129) girls feel that it will never return. Similarly, 81.75 per cent (f=327) rural and 68 per cent (f=272) urban adolescents hope that peace will prevail. Thus majority adolescents 74.9 per cent (f=599) expect that normalcy will return. However, 25.1 per cent feel that it will never return. With reference to return of normalcy in Kashmir intact and disrupted adolescents have insignificant differences χ^2 (1,800) =0.16, p=0.68. However, highly significant differences are found between adolescent boys and girls

χ^2 (1,800) = 21.5, $p=0.00$ along with rural and urban adolescents χ^2 (1,800) =20.1, $p=0.00$. Normalcy in Kashmir shows negative insignificant correlation among intact-disrupted adolescents r (800) =-0.014, $p=0.684$. While as, positive highly significant correlation is seen among adolescent boys-girls r (800) =-0.164, $p=0.000$ and rural-urban adolescents r (800) =-0.159, $p=0.000$.

Table 2 founds that return of normalcy in Kashmir is expected by 88.5 per cent ($f=177$) intact rural adolescents, while 40 per cent ($f=80$) intact urban adolescents never expect it. On contrary to this, 75 per cent ($f=150$) disrupted rural and 76 per cent ($f=152$) disrupted urban adolescents believe that normalcy will definitely return in Valley. In relation to return of normalcy in Kashmir, highly significant differences are apparent between intact rural-urban adolescents χ^2 (1,400) =42.48, $p=0.00$. Whereas disrupted rural and disrupted urban adolescents show insignificant differences χ^2 (1,400) =0.54, $p=0.816$. Normalcy in Kashmir as per dwelling unveils positive significant correlation among intact rural-urban adolescents r (400) =0.175, $p=0.000$. Disrupted rural-urban adolescents too reveal negative highly significant correlation r (400) =-0.171, $p=0.001$.

Table 3 describes that among intact boys, 86 per cent ($f=172$) hope that normalcy will return, while 37.5 per cent ($f=75$) intact girls feel that it will never return. Similarly, 78 per cent ($f=156$) disrupted boys have faith that normalcy will return, but 27 per cent ($f=54$) disrupted girls don't have faith for peace in valley. With reference to normalcy in Kashmir, highly significant differences are seen among intact boys-girls χ^2 (1,400) =28.8, $p=0.00$. However, insignificant differences are marked among disrupted boys-girls χ^2 (1,400) =3.20, $p=0.24$. Highly significant positive correlation is spotted among intact boys-girls r (400) = 0.269, $p=0.000$. However, positive insignificant correlation among disrupted boys and girls r (400) =0.058, $p=0.246$.

Chandra (2011) ^[15] observed that near normalcy was established in Kashmir after 2008 elections and the downtrend in insurgency through 2009 and 2010 but mismanagement in developments again lead to unrest in 2010.

Way Out for Normalcy in Kashmir

After every tumult since 1989 lot of recommendations have been put forward about bringing permanent peace to valley like autonomy, self rule, and plebiscite etc. Table 1 studies that 67.3 per cent ($f=200$) intact and 71.9 per cent ($f=217$) disrupted adolescents believe that freedom from present administration will bring peace. But 12.5 per cent ($f=37$) intact adolescents and 10.3 per cent ($f=31$) disrupted adolescents think that solution lies in demilitarization and war between India-Pakistan respectively. Likewise, 72.86 per cent ($f=239$) boys and 65.68 per cent girls ($f=178$) reflect that freedom from present administration can lead to normalcy. Although, 12.5 per cent ($f=41$) boys and 9.48 per cent ($f=31$) girls respectively view India-Pakistan war and demilitarization as way-out for calm. Rural adolescents i.e.70.64 per cent ($f=231$) and 68.38 per cent ($f=186$) urban adolescents

also opt freedom from present administration as solution but as per 9.48 per cent rural and 11.39 per cent urban adolescents demilitarization and good governance is key to peace. Hence 69.6 per cent (417) adolescents put freedom from present administration as foremost solution. A low percentage i.e.7.3 ($f=44$) and 7.0 ($f=42$) respectively preferred good governance and peaceful dialogue. In relation to way-out for normalcy in Kashmir highly significant differences are observed among intact-disrupted adolescents χ^2 (800) =37.8, $p=0.00$; adolescent boys and girls χ^2 (5,800) = 83.0, $p=0.00$ and among rural and urban adolescents χ^2 (5,800) =28.4, $p=0.00$. Way-out for normalcy in Kashmir reveals negative insignificant correlation among intact-disrupted adolescents r (800) =-0.057, $p=0.167$ and rural-urban adolescents r (800) =-0.112, $p=0.006$. While, positive insignificant correlation among adolescent boys-girls r (800) =-0.012, $p=0.763$.

Table 2 reveals that freedom from present administration is chosen by 66.7 per cent ($f=118$) intact rural, 68.3 per cent ($f=82$) intact urban adolescents as well as by 75.3 per cent ($f=113$) disrupted rural and 68.4 per cent disrupted urban adolescents as way-out for normalcy in Kashmir. Whereas, 16.4 per cent ($f=29$) intact rural and 15 per cent ($f=18$) urban adolescents opt demilitarization and good governance respectively for bringing normalcy. In contrast to this, 8 per cent ($f=12$) disrupted rural and 12.5 per cent ($f=19$) urban adolescents believe that war between India-Pakistan can solve Kashmir issue permanently. In terms of way-out for normalcy in Kashmir, highly significant differences are clear between intact rural and intact urban adolescents χ^2 (5,400) =52.5, $p=0.00$. While, insignificant differences are observable among disrupted rural and disrupted urban adolescents χ^2 (1,400) =2.35, $p=0.798$. Way-out for normalcy in Kashmir as per dwelling shows positive significant correlation among disrupted rural-urban adolescents r (400) =0.142, $p=0.019$. However, intact rural-urban adolescents show negative highly significant correlation r (400) = -0.209, $p= 0.000$.

Table 3 describes that 73.8 per cent ($f=127$) intact boys and 58.4 per cent intact girls ($f=73$) freedom from present administration is ultimate solution for bringing peace. Although 9.9 per cent ($f=17$) intact boys and 27.2 per cent ($f=34$) intact girls chose implementation of Shariah law and demilitarization as way-out to normalcy respectively. In a similar way, 71.8 per cent ($f=112$) disrupted boys and 71.9 per cent ($f=105$) disrupted girls believe that freedom from present administration can bring normalcy, while 19.9 per cent ($f=31$) believe that war between India-Pakistan will lead to normalcy and 10.3 per cent ($f=15$) disrupted girls have trust in good governance. In terms of solution to normalcy in Kashmir, highly significant differences are observed among intact boys-intact girls χ^2 (5,400) =67.6, $p=0.00$ and disrupted boys-girls χ^2 (5,400) =50.4, $p=0.00$. Way-out for normalcy in Kashmir as per gender shows positive significant correlation among intact boys-girls r (400) =0.11, $p=0.05$ but insignificant negative correlation between disrupted boys-girls r (400) =-0.070, $p=0.226$.

Founds that most of the youth on the basis of sex, education and locale believed that peace education is

relevant in Kashmir because from last 20 years Kashmiri's are suffering from different forms of violence. Thousands of lives have been lost since 1989 due to the intensification of the conflict. Peace education will introduce new peaceful concepts about the conflict resolution and the youth of Kashmir will be ready to adopt peaceful means for the resolution of internal issues of Kashmir. Majority of the youth have supported that peace education will create means for the resolution of internal issues of Kashmir. Observed that youth in Kashmir support freedom from all kinds of human rights abuses, freedom of speech, and restoration of peace and

prevalence of democratic space along with other endowments of a functional and stable society. reported that Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, conducted a survey on "Popular Perception of the Kashmir Conflict" in the border districts of Kupwara, Handwara and Sopore during 1-6 June 2003 with 203 people and found that 54 percent are optimistic about the possibility of an Indo-Pak dialogue vis-a-vis Kashmir, 75 percent advocate self-governing Kashmir as a viable and lasting solution to the Kashmir dispute, 83 percent believe that the United States has an important role to play in the resolution of the Kashmir issue.

Table 1: Attitude Regarding Armed Conflict

Variable	Category (N=800)				Gender (N=800)				Dwelling (N=800)				All adolescents (n=800)	
	Intact adolescents (n=400)		Disrupted adolescents (n=400)		Adolescent boys (n=400)		Adolescent girls (n=400)		Rural adolescents (n=400)		Urban adolescents (n=400)			
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
Perception regarding armed conflict in Kashmir														
Political conflict	289	72.2	315	78.8	297	74.25	307	76.75	303	75.75	301	75.25	604	75.5
Historical conflict	31	7.8	33	8.2	38	9.5	26	6.5	30	7.5	34	8.5	64	8.0
Religious conflict	49	12.2	23	5.8	46	11.5	26	6.5	37	9.25	35	8.75	72	9.0
Conflict between communities	31	7.8	29	7.2	19	4.75	41	10.25	30	7.5	30	7.5	60	7.5
χ^2	10.63, df=3, p=0.01				16.03, df=3, p=0.00				0.312, df=3, p=0.95					
r	-0.077, p=0.029				-0.013, p=0.722				.004, p=0.914					
Responsible for unrest in Kashmir														
Militants	12	3.0	11	2.8	16	4	7	1.75	10	2.5	13	3.25	23	2.9
Armed force	171	42.8	141	35.2	189	47.25	123	30.75	143	35.75	169	42.25	312	39.0
Local leaders	13	3.2	8	2.0	9	2.25	12	3.25	8	2	13	3.25	21	2.6
State government	204	51.0	240	60.0	186	46.5	258	64.5	239	59.75	205	51.25	444	55.5
χ^2	7.03, df=3, p=0.07				29.58, df=3, p=0.00				6.35, df=3, p=0.09					
r	0.085, p=0.017				0.190, p=0.000				-0.082, p=0.021					
Normalcy in Kashmir														
Will return	297	74.2	302	75.5	328	82	271	67.75	327	81.75	272	68	599	74.9
Will not return	103	25.8	98	24.5	72	18	129	32.25	73	18.25	128	32	201	25.1
χ^2	0.166, df= 1, p=0.68				21.5, df=1, p=0.00				20.1, df=1, p=0.00					
r	-0.014, p=0.684				0.164, p=0.000				0.159, p=0.000					
Way out for normalcy in Kashmir														
Good governance	19	6.4	25	8.3	22	6.70	22	8.11	13	3.97	31	11.39	44	7.3
Freedom from present administration	200	67.3	217	71.9	239	72.86	178	65.68	231	70.64	186	68.38	417	69.6
Demilitarization	37	12.5	5	1.7	4	1.21	38	14.02	31	9.48	11	4.04	42	7.0
Peaceful dialogue	14	4.7	9	3.0	4	1.21	19	7.01	7	2.14	16	5.88	23	3.8
War between India and Pakistan	10	3.4	31	10.3	41	12.5	0	0.0	21	6.42	20	7.3	41	6.8
Implementation of Shariah law	17	5.7	15	5.0	18	5.48	14	5.16	24	7.33	8	2.94	32	5.3
χ^2	37.8, df=5, p=0.00				83.0, df=5, p=0.00				28.4, df=5, p=0.00					
r	-0.057, p=0.167				0.012, p=0.763				-0.112, p=0.006					

Table 2: Attitude Regarding Armed Conflict as per Dwelling

Variable	Intact (N=400)				Disrupted (N=400)			
	Rural		Urban		Rural		Urban	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
Perception regarding armed conflict in Kashmir								
Political conflict	146	73.0	143	71.5	157	78.5	158	79.0
Historical conflict	13	6.5	18	9.0	17	8.5	16	8.0
Religious conflict	25	12.5	24	12.0	12	6.0	11	5.5
Conflict between communities	16	8.0	15	7.5	14	7.0	15	7.5
χ^2	0.89, df=3, p=0.82				0.111, df=3, p=0.99			
r	-0.069, p=0.167				-0.085, p=0.091			

Responsible for unrest in Kashmir								
Militants	4	2.0	8	4.0	6	3.0	5	2.5
Armed force	81	40.5	90	45.0	62	31.0	79	39.5
Local leaders	4	2.0	9	4.5	4	2.0	4	2.0
State government	111	55.5	93	46.5	128	64.0	112	56.0
χ^2	5.31, df=3, p=0.14				3.20, df=3, p=0.36			
r	0.081, p=0.105				0.088, p=0.078			
Normalcy in Kashmir								
Will return	177	88.5	120	60.0	150	75.0	152	76.0
Will not return	23	11.5	80	40.0	50	25.0	48	24.0
χ^2	42.48, df=1, p=0.00				0.54, df=1, p=0.816			
r	0.175, p=0.000				-0.171, p=0.001			
Way out for normalcy in Kashmir								
Good governance	1	0.6	18	15.0	12	8.0	13	8.6
Freedom from present administration	118	66.7	82	68.3	113	75.3	104	68.4
Demilitarization	29	16.4	8	6.7	2	1.3	3	2.0
Peaceful dialogue	3	1.7	11	9.5	4	2.7	5	3.3
War between India and Pakistan	9	5.1	1	0.8	12	8.0	19	12.5
Implementation of Shariah law	17	9.6	0	0.0	7	4.7	8	5.3
χ^2	52.5, df=5, p=0.00				2.35, df=5, p=7.98			
r	-0.209, p=0.000				0.142, p=0.019			

Based on field survey
 df denotes degree of freedom
 χ^2 denotes chi square
 p denotes Karl Pearson level of significance
 r denotes spearman's correlation

Table 3: Attitude Regarding Armed Conflict as per Gender

Variable	Intact (N=400)				Disrupted (N=400)			
	Boys		Girls		Boys		Girls	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
Perception regarding armed conflict in Kashmir								
Political conflict	144	72.0	145	72.5	153	76.5	162	81.0
Historical conflict	17	8.5	14	7.0	21	10.5	12	6.0
Religious conflict	31	15.5	18	9.0	15	7.5	8	4.0
Conflict between communities	8	4.0	23	11.5	11	5.5	18	9.0
χ^2	11.00, df=3, p=0.011				6.53, df=3, p=0.08			
r	0.014, p=0.776				-0.042, p=0.484			
Responsible for unrest in Kashmir								
Militants	9	4.5	3	1.5	7	3.5	4	2.0
Armed force	92	46.0	79	39.5	97	48.5	44	22.0
Local leaders	9	4.5	4	2.0	0	0.0	8	4.0
State government	90	45.0	114	57.0	96	48.0	144	72.0
χ^2	8.73, df=3, p=0.033				38.34, df=3, p=0.00			
r	0.119, p=0.017				0.261, p=0.000			
Normalcy in Kashmir								
Will return	172	86.0	125	62.5	156	78.0	146	73.0
Will not return	28	14.0	75	37.5	44	22.0	54	27.0
χ^2	28.8, df=1, p=0.00				1.35, df=1, p=0.244			
r	0.269, p=0.00				0.058, p=0.246			
Way out for normalcy in Kashmir								
Good governance	12	7.0	7	5.6	10	6.4	15	10.3
Freedom from present administration	127	73.8	73	58.4	112	71.8	105	71.9
Demilitarization	3	1.7	34	27.2	1	0.6	4	2.7
Peaceful dialogue	3	1.7	11	8.8	1	0.6	8	5.5
War between India and Pakistan	10	5.8	0	0.0	31	19.9	0	0.0
Implementation of Shariah law	17	9.9	0	0.0	1	0.6	14	9.6
χ^2	67.6, df=5, p=0.00				50.4, df=5, p=0.00			
r	0.111, p=0.056				-0.070, p=0.226			

Based on field survey
 df denotes degree of freedom
 χ^2 denotes chi square
 p denotes pearson's and spearman's level of significance
 r denotes spearman's correlation

Conclusion

Majority of adolescents perceive armed conflict in Kashmir as political conflict. Some of intact adolescents term it as religious conflict; some adolescent girls perceive it as conflict between communities; while some rural adolescents regard it as historical conflict. State government is responsible for unrest in Kashmir as per most of the intact-disrupted adolescents, intact rural-urban adolescents, disrupted rural-urban adolescents, intact boys-girls and disrupted boys-girls. Whereas, good number of adolescents hold armed forces responsible for unrest in Kashmir. A meager fraction of adolescents hold local leaders and militants responsible. Most intact and disrupted adolescents think that normalcy will return in Kashmir. Same thought is also expressed by majority of rural-urban adolescents as well as adolescent boys-girls. Freedom from present administration is way out for normalcy in Kashmir as per most adolescents. Same idea is reflected by intact rural-urban adolescents, disrupted rural-urban adolescents, intact boys-girls and disrupted boys-girls.

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